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its Response Strategy 
Manpreet Sethi* 
Abstract 
This article analyses the three kinds of nuclear threats that 
India faces; Pakistan, China and nuclear terrorism. To 
counter Pakistan‟s nuclear threat against India‟s 
conventional military superiority, India‟s strategy has 
been assured retaliation in response to a „first use‟, 
irrespective of its yield or choice of target. Though, 
China‟s nuclear strategy is against the United States, it 
poses a considerable security threat to India. India has 
acquired a nuclear triad to be able to mount an effective 
second strike capability, reaching almost all the cities of 
China. To counter nuclear terrorism, India collaborates 
internationally to counter such challenges.  
Keywords: Nuclear Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Nuclear 
Terrorism   
1. Introduction 
India‟s nuclear challenges are unique in many ways. India seeks a 
workable deterrent strategy against two nuclear powers with 
different nuclear doctrines and capabilities. In fact, the nuclear 
situation for India is a complex web of diverse strategic 
relationships since its two nuclear-armed adversaries also share a 
robust nuclear and missile proliferation relationship between 
themselves. India shares not only contested borders but also 
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territorial disputes with both these countries; a reality that make 
border skirmishes a routine affair. While immense literature from 
the Cold War years is available on nuclear deterrence, most of it 
pertains to a bipolar nuclear confrontation between nations that 
were geographically distant. Much of this cannot apply to India 
given the nuclear „tri-lemma‟ that it faces with contiguous nations. 
Therefore, India must necessarily find its own way to address its 
nuclear challenges.  
Besides the nuclear challenges from Pakistan and China in the 
context of their changing nuclear and missile capabilities, India also 
faces a third challenge-nuclear terrorism. The paper is divided into 
three sections, each of which examines the three threats and offers 
an optimal Indian response at the doctrinal, capability build up and 
signaling levels.  
2.  The Challenge from Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy 
Pakistan has a well-thought out and intelligent nuclear strategy 
that optimally fulfils the role for which it acquired nuclear 
weapons. Its nuclear strategy is solely focussed on deterring India. 
However, its nuclear weapons intend not to deter the nuclear 
weapons of India but the possibility of a conventional engagement 
with a superior Indian military; a possibility which it fears could 
arise as a result of its pursuit of terrorism. Terrorism has been a 
critical tool for the Pakistan foreign policy in order to keep India 
unsettled and to gain parity.  
The acquisition of nuclear weapons has further lent support to this 
strategy by supposedly liberating Pakistan of the fear of any 
punitive response from India owing to the possibility of a nuclear 
escalation. Therefore, Pakistan‟s nuclear strategy is premised on 
augmenting these fears by projecting an immediate and inevitable 
escalation to the nuclear level in case of a conventional conflict. It is 
done to evoke fear not only to deter India but also to scare the 
international audience by playing up the possibility of a nuclear 
exchange between the two nations. Therefore, Pakistan 
communicates an inevitability of its nuclear use, however 
irrational, in order to establish deterrence with India.  
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Projecting a low nuclear threshold, Pakistan has naturally opted for 
a nuclear strategy of using nuclear weapons against an Indian 
conventional strike. In order to make this look credible, Pakistan is 
reportedly adding rapidly to its nuclear warheads as well as fissile 
material and is also undertaking tests of delivery systems of the 
very short-range variety. Hatf IX or Nasr, a claimed nuclear-
capable missile, with a range of no more than 60 kms has been 
explained as a measure “to add deterrence value to Pakistan‟s 
strategic weapons development programme at shorter ranges” 
(ISPR, The Tribune, 2011). Obviously, such a system could only be 
a battlefield weapon and many strategic analysts in Pakistan and in 
the U.S have described it as a measure of countering a threat. Such 
attacks with low yield nuclear weapons on military targets could be 
to shock, create a sense of further danger, signal determination to 
intimidate India and to hinder its conventional operations. 
Furthermore, it also aims to get the international community to 
intervene and pressurise India against a nuclear retaliation. 
While these motivations are quite understandable, the folly of 
undertaking such use of nuclear weapons cannot be lost on 
Rawalpindi either. A first strike/use strategy poses many 
challenges in execution. Pakistan might like to project that such 
first use with a battlefield nuclear weapon would be able to control 
the adversary‟s threshold of retaliation by coercing India to 
terminate the war and by not causing damage large enough to 
justify nuclear retaliation. Therefore, Pakistan assumes that its use 
of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) would have simultaneously 
performed the tasks of retaining the upper hand on the use of 
nuclear weapons to bring about war termination while also 
ensuring damage limitation to its own territory.  In fact, in such a 
conceived use of the nuclear tipped missile, its military 
effectiveness may be of little importance to Pakistan. The message 
they would be seeking to send through the game of brinkmanship 
would be targeted fully and completely at the political level.  
Therefore, the purpose of introducing nuclear weapons would 
certainly not be to redress balance on the battlefield but to make 
war too painful or too dangerous to continue by suggesting an 
expanding exchange of violence inflicted by the small yield 
weapon. Also, as stated earlier, a second assumption would be that 
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the international community would stop India from nuclear 
retaliation.  
Each one of these assumptions, however, could prove to be wrong. 
The behaviour of India and the international community after the 
use of a nuclear weapon, irrespective of the target and the yield of 
the weapon, or even the extent of damage suffered, could turn out 
to be completely contrary to Pakistani assumptions. Given that 
nuclear weapons have not been used in the last seven decades, a 
nuclear taboo against their use exists. Therefore, the use of a 
nuclear weapon would have strategic implications beyond India-
Pakistan and no leader deciding on such a use could take it lightly.  
That said, India cannot depend solely on the taboo alone to weigh 
in on Pakistan‟s calculations. Its own deterrent strategy must be 
credible and effective too. So, what should be India‟s response to 
Pakistan‟s nuclear strategy? 
3.  India’s Response to the Nuclear Challenge from Pakistan 
There appears to be little need for India to change either its nuclear 
doctrine or nuclear arsenal specific to moves such as Pakistan‟s 
TNW. India‟s approach to nuclear weapons has been categorical in 
maintaining that it has no interest in nuclear war fighting – 
whether with small yield weapons on the battlefield or with large 
bombs on cities. The purpose of the Indian nuclear weapon is 
narrow and limited to safeguarding the country against nuclear 
coercion, blackmail or its possible use. The path it has chosen to 
achieve this is through the suggestion of deterrence by punishment. 
This strategy seeks to deter nuclear use by conveying assured 
retaliation in response to a first use, irrespective of its yield or 
choice of target. India‟s response would be meant to cause 
unacceptable damage. In that sense, the threshold for Indian 
nuclear use is very clearly stated as any kind of first use “on Indian 
territory or on Indian forces anywhere” (Cabinet Committee, 2009). 
For India, therefore, any use of the nuclear weapon would have 
strategic implications and would invoke a punitive response. The 
focus of the Indian nuclear arsenal must continue to remain on 
ensuring credibility through survivability of reliable delivery 
systems to mount necessary retaliation.  
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In twenty years of operationalisation of its nuclear arsenal, India 
does have enough deployed missiles to cater to any nuclear 
contingency emanating from Pakistan. Meanwhile, in order to 
counter Pakistan‟s nuclear strategy premised on brinkmanship, 
India would do well to conduct effective nuclear signalling. It is 
well known that credible nuclear deterrence is derived as much 
from capability as from communication of resolve to use that 
capability. It, therefore, rests on the removal of all doubt from the 
mind of the adversary that any misadventure by him would result 
in assured retaliation that would inflict unacceptable costs. The 
effective communication of strength of resolve can go a long way in 
addressing some of the assumptions that seem to be underpinning 
Pakistani moves.  
Fortunately, communication of resolve can be displayed through a 
range of actions. In fact, the resolve does not have to be conveyed 
through a nuclear war. Rather, indications of resolve can be made 
evident in actions such as firmness in law, order enforcement on 
the domestic front, decisiveness in policy making, the pursuit of 
inter-state relations, zero tolerance for terrorism, and so on. India‟s 
lack of action to mete out punishment to Pakistan even after a 
series of acts of terrorism since 2007 had lent itself to the 
impression that the country had a weak resolve to retaliate. That 
changed in September 2016 when India publicly announced 
conducting surgical strikes against active terrorist launch pads in 
Pakistan. India‟s effort at diplomatically isolating Pakistan and 
publicly naming and shaming it as the mother-ship of terrorism 
also indicate India‟s intention of punishing future acts of terrorism 
emanating from Pakistan.  
Therefore, in nuclear strategy, it is not essential to respond to every 
nuclear capability driven move of the adversary. While the 
developments certainly need to be monitored, the initiative must be 
retained by the self in terms of choosing an own response instead 
of automatically following the trends set in motion by the other 
side.  India is not interested in fighting a nuclear war, whether of 
the limited and tactical variety or a larger strategic exchange. In 
fact, for enhancing India‟s nuclear deterrent with respect to 
Pakistan, it is necessary to undertake manipulation of perceptions 
on India‟s willingness to take necessary actions to handle 
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deterrence breakdown. According to an analyst, “It makes no sense 
to surprise an opponent with unanticipated retaliation when a clear 
signal could have deterred unwanted activity in the first place” 
(Wirtz, 2012). Building nuclear capability is meaningless if the 
adversary does not know about it, misreads it, or if he doubts the 
resolve to put it to use. It is critical, therefore, to convey a coherent 
and consistent message so that the adversary does not premise his 
own nuclear strategy on mistaken assumptions. This is the aspect 
that needs to be emphasized in order to address the nuclear 
challenge posed by Pakistan‟s nuclear strategy.  
4.  The Challenge from China’s Nuclear Modernisation 
China has been steadily modernising its strategic capabilities over 
the last three decades.  Clearly, Chinese nuclear hardware – its 
nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities – have steadily 
undergone an upgradation. This has been enabled by the country‟s 
sustained economic growth and consequent liberal spending on 
military modernisation. It is being justified by the changes in the 
country‟s threat perceptions arising from the prospect of the 
deployment of ballistic missile defence (BMD) by the USA. Of 
particular concern to China is the deployment of Theatre Missile 
Defence (TMD) over Taiwan that could jeopardize China‟s 
reunification policy.  
As a result of these developments, China is engaged in a rapid but 
intelligent nuclear modernisation. It is choosing capabilities after a 
careful consideration of the vulnerabilities of the USA. Though 
China remains absolutely opaque on the number of its nuclear 
warheads except to state that it has the smallest arsenal among all 
the five nuclear weapon states (NWS), estimates about its nuclear 
numbers vary from 200 to 450. But these figures are essentially 
guesstimates; neither confirmed nor denied by China‟s officialdom. 
Given that it seeks to deter through the threat of its ability to cause 
„unacceptable damage‟, the focus of Chinese efforts has been to 
build capabilities that can assure such damage. Accordingly, China 
has made progress in improving missile capabilities. Particular 
attention can be seen towards developing measures that can assure 
survivability of missiles since China subscribes to the doctrine of no 
first use of nuclear weapons. The credibility of its deterrence is 
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therefore dependent on being able to inflict such damage even after 
taking the first strike on itself.  
Consequently, China has placed greater emphasis on increasing the 
numbers, reliability, accuracy and mobility of its missiles. It has 
been engaged in building more solid-fuelled, rail and road-mobile 
missiles. Further, realising the vulnerability of land-based missiles 
despite the best survivability measures, the spotlight has been on 
making sea-based deterrence capability operational. A Chinese 
Admiral, Liu Huaqing, had highlighted this emphasis in the 1990s 
when he stated, “In the face of a large-scale nuclear attack, only less 
than 10 per cent of the coastal launching silos will survive, whereas 
submarines armed with ballistic missiles can use the surface of the 
sea to protect and cover themselves, preserve the nuclear offensive 
force and play a deterrent and containment role.”(Ji, 1999) The sea 
leg of the Chinese nuclear triad rests on Julang 2 (JL- 2), a second 
generation submarine-launched a ballistic missile (SLBM) of a little 
over 7000 km range that would be deployed on indigenous Type 
094 submarines. These Jin class SSBNs (some currently without the 
missile component that is still under trials for greater reliability and 
accuracy) have reportedly started undertaking sea patrols since 
2015 (Shim, 2015).  
Meanwhile, though air delivery was the first capability available 
with China after it developed nuclear weapons, this remained a 
weak arm, given the short-range of aircrafts and their inability to 
penetrate enemy air defences. But, China has changed the situation 
by inducting H-6K bombers fitted with engines of greater thrust 
power and reinforced fuselage structure. Armed with dual use, 
long-range cruise missiles of  a range of 2,500 kms, the H-6K, even 
if a subsonic bomber, is now believed to have the operational 
capability to effectively project nuclear deterrence (Chang, 2007).  
With the American BMD in mind, China has invested heavily in 
developing technical counter-measures such as the use of chaff, 
decoys, balloons, and stealth technologies. More significantly, 
China has worked on making its missiles equipped with multiple 
independently retargetable vehicles/warheads (MIRVs) (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 2003). China is known to have been miniaturising 
warheads to make them lighter and easier to deploy in multiple 
numbers ranging from 3-10 atop its delivery systems (Gertz, 2016). 
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Secondly, Beijing has also developed the capability to make the re-
entry of its nuclear warhead manoeuvrable (MARVed missiles) 
thereby making it difficult to intercept.  
A lot of new technologies will be dependent on space-based 
capabilities and China is rapidly modernising these both for 
offensive and defensive operations.  Beijing‟s demonstration of an 
anti-satellite (ASAT) capability in 2007 came from the 
determination that a robust ASAT capability could counter the 
USA by disabling the "complex, exposed network of command, 
control, communications, and computer-based systems that 
provide intelligence [and] reconnaissance" to American forces.i 
Indeed, Chinese defence planners see the networked nature of 
American forces as their principal vulnerability. China‟s endeavour 
is to develop capabilities that could blind US sensory and 
networking organs (surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence 
assets in space) and it appears to be pursuing this in a determined 
fashion through the development of a range of technologies 
including directed energy weapons and electronic attacks through 
sophisticated jamming technologies.  
It is apparent that China is moving up to a higher level of strategic 
capability. In fact, while earlier, its nuclear deterrence was largely 
based on ambiguity and secrecy in numbers and capability, it is 
now being derived from mobility, invulnerability and penetrability 
of its nuclear delivery systems. However, this need not 
automatically lead to the conclusion that China would be keen to 
engage in nuclear war-fighting. Rather, it is likely to use the 
transparency it has allowed about the development of these 
capabilities to further the deterrent value of its nuclear weapons. 
This capability enhancement and its concomitant impact on 
deterrence are primarily meant for the USA. But it obviously has a 
downstream effect on its deterrent equation with India too. So, how 
should India look at these developments of Chinese strategic 
modernisation and what responses should it focus on? 
5.  India’s Response to the Nuclear Challenge from China 
The implications of China‟s nuclear modernisation for India arise 
more from having to face the prospect of a more assertive China in 
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the coming years. Certainly, with a rise in its perception of 
comprehensive national power (nuclear capability being one 
component), China does believe it carries more weight today. This 
gives it the confidence to actively participate in the international 
rule-making or rule breaking with impunity; aspects that India 
must watch out for. China respects strength and hence India must 
focus on building capability that communicates its nuclear strength 
in order to address the challenge posed by China‟s strategic 
modernisation. 
Amongst the technological advancements that India must focus on 
after having developed and deployed a number of land-based 
ballistic missiles, (including the Agni variants that are solid-fuelled 
missiles and rail and road mobile) are the long-range, canisterised 
Agni V missiles. These are currently in a process of being tested so 
as to be ready for operational induction. Another urgent pending 
task is the true operationalisation of the sea-based leg of India‟s 
nuclear triad. The recent commissioning of INS Arihant, India‟s 
indigenous SSBN, has marked the initiation of the journey. But an 
operational, credible sea-based deterrence requires a fleet of at least 
4-5 SSBNs. These can then provide a higher level of survivability 
particularly if future boats carry SLBMs of longer ranges. What has 
been tested until now are the K-15 with a range of 700 - 750 kms 
and the K-4 with a range of 2000-2500 kms (Times of India, 2014). 
These ranges are insufficient for credible deterrence against China. 
The missiles have to go up to a range of at least 5000 kms and more 
to reach targets whose loss would be deemed unacceptable by 
Beijing while themselves remaining far away from the adversary. 
Thirdly, the focus must be retained on improving the penetrability 
of Indian missiles. Fortunately, China‟s BMD is still of limited 
capability. But, Indian missiles will have to be equipped with 
increasingly sophisticated counter-measures to evade interception 
in order to convey the capacity to cause unacceptable damage. 
Therefore, development of multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs), 
which hit the same target with many bombs, and manoeuvrable re-
entry vehicles (MaRV) that can drastically change trajectory to 
evade interception in the terminal stage, are capabilities that will 
help in buttressing deterrence. Meanwhile, MIRVed missiles have 
essentially been considered first strike weapons and do not really 
find a place in India's NFU strategy. However, given the trend 
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towards this development in the region, India would be prudent to 
keep options open while it focusses on other more urgent tasks 
towards enhancing the credibility of deterrence. 
This implies that while mere numbers and balance of force might 
not be relevant because the scale of destruction caused by even a 
few nuclear weapons could constitute unacceptable damage, what 
is critical is to ensure that sufficient warheads and delivery vehicles 
survive a first strikeii and be ready for retaliation. This calls for the 
creation of a secure second-strike potential in the form of hardened 
silos, mobile launchers, deployment beyond the reach of hostile 
delivery systems, dispersion of the arsenal on a triad, and 
structured weapon release authority in order to guarantee an 
assured appropriate response. Reliability of the delivery system is 
critical for deterrence credibility and this includes dependability of 
communication (that the correct message is delivered at the right 
time for launch); of launch (that the missile actually lifts off); of the 
booster (that it ignites in time); of separation (of the booster from 
the missile after burn out); of penetration (despite enemy air 
defence systems); and of detonation (at the designated target). 
A robust Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence 
systems (C3I) is also critical to ensure that the nuclear assets remain 
secure in peacetime but can make the shift to fully employable 
forces when necessary in the shortest possible time for effective 
retaliation. Such a system comprises personnel, procedures that 
acquire, collate, analyse and interpret information to assist decision 
making and equipment that enables acquisition and transmission 
of decisions to different constituents of the force in real time. 
Effective surveillance and early warning capabilities to acquire 
intelligence on adversary‟s force posture is also necessary to 
minimise risks of a miscalculated or inadvertent strike based on 
faulty intelligence or false alarms.  
6. The Challenge of Nuclear Terrorism 
The term nuclear terrorism generally encompasses three kinds of 
actions by non-state actors. These include the use of a readymade 
nuclear weapon from an existing national nuclear arsenal by a non-
state actor; an act of sabotage of a nuclear facility that contains 
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fissile/radiological material or the use of radiological dispersal 
devices or dirty bombs. Of the three, the possibility of the first kind 
of nuclear terrorism is the most difficult given that nuclear 
weapons in national arsenals are well accounted for and protected. 
Theft or pilferage of whole nuclear weapons, including delivery 
systems and knowledge of electronic codes to launch them, cannot 
be an easy task for any terrorist organisation unless of course, there 
is state complicity in such an activity. The second act of sabotage is 
relatively difficult to envisage given that nations with nuclear 
facilities are sensitive to nuclear safety and security requirements 
necessary to keep them from harm‟s way. However, the last kind of 
activity could be the most worrisome given that such devices can 
be crafted with little quantities of nuclear or radiological material 
along with conventional explosives. This could be possible if the 
terrorist could lay his hands on enough nuclear/radiological 
material through theft, purchase on the illicit market, or insider 
cooperation from an employee at a nuclear facility.  
Crafting a dirty bomb is also perfectly possible by mixing high 
explosives with relatively long-lived radioactive isotopes such as 
cesium 137, strontium 90, or cobalt 60 which are found in places 
other than nuclear establishments. Most of these are available at 
universities, hospitals and industries that may be less secure than 
nuclear facilities. For instance, Cobalt 60 is used to sterilise surgical 
instruments, in cancer treatment, food irradiation, gauges, and 
radiography as well as to improve the safety and reliability of 
industrial fuel oil burners. Similarly, strontium 90 is used in survey 
meters by schools, the military and emergency management 
authorities, as also in cigarette manufacturing sensors and for 
medical treatment. 
Given the relatively easy portability of radiological materials, lax 
security at sites where they are used and the likelihood of some of 
these sources being orphaned or casually discarded over time, 
RDDs are far easier to construct, conceal or detonate by terrorists 
than the first case of their use of a nuclear weapon. An RDD may 
also be perceived as being more useful to terrorise rather than kill 
too many people since the impact of such an incident would be 
more in terms of creating economic problems, logistic disruptions 
and psychological panic among the people. The chaos so created 
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might serve the interest of the terrorists more than causing mass 
deaths and the resultant revulsion.  
The possibility of such a terrorist act being mounted against India 
is not all that remote. It is surprising that despite being a victim of 
terrorism for decades and despite the entry of nuclear weapons into 
the region (particularly in Pakistan which has a penchant for use of 
terrorism), India has never articulated an official policy towards the 
use of RDD. In fact, there does not exist any detailed official 
assessment of the threat (at least not in the public domain). The 
situation is further exacerbated when one realises that Pakistan 
may not exercise complete control over the myriad militant 
organisations that it has supported over time. A scholar who has 
been a keen Pakistan watcher, Christine Fair, has provided a good 
sense of the picture that she obtains in Pakistan when she candidly 
admits, “Despite its seeming dedication to combating those 
elements of the TTP that target the state, Pakistan will likely remain 
unable or unwilling to eliminate even those groups, owing to the 
overlapping membership between the vehemently anti-state 
components of the TTP and Deobandi groups that Pakistan still 
views as assets as well as to Islamabad‟s fear that its militant 
proxies will be crucial allies in any future war against India” (Fair, 
2014). In addition, in his testimony to the House Committee on 
Homeland Security, Steve Coll, President of New America 
Foundation stated, "having nurtured Islamist groups…, Pakistan 
has been weakened by their virulence and revolutionary ambition, 
and the state now lacks the capacity to wipe out the groups without 
paying a very high price and incurring great risks…" (Coll, 2011).  
Many splinter groups have appeared in recent times and many of 
these are known to be against their own establishment. Given many 
such groups, including the Pakistani Taliban that is waging an 
insurgency against the country, the chances of "a splinter group 
armed with nuclear expertise and access from within the Pakistani 
establishment looks increasingly feasible" (Coll, 2011). So, how 
should India handle this threat? 
7. India’s Response to the Challenge of Nuclear Terrorism 
India has enthusiastically joined international attempts aimed at 
addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is a member of nearly 
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all the international treaties and conventions aimed at enhancing 
nuclear security. It has also participated actively with the IAEA in 
updating its guidelines and conducting international training 
courses on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and 
materials. 
Meanwhile, within the country, Central Industrial Security Force 
(CISF) is entrusted with the task of security of these establishments 
and over the last years, the training and equipment of the 
personnel have been given special attention. Apart from that, the 
preparedness of India to handle nuclear terrorism traverses four 
main domains – legal provisions, surveillance and safety 
mechanisms, emergency response mechanisms and external 
collaboration. While elements of all the four domains are in place, 
one can never assert with any guarantee that the nation‟s nuclear 
security is perfect since it is heavily dependent on the international 
climate as well as the support, or lack of it, from other countries. In 
case of India, the enforcement of these measures by the countries in 
the region is of particular importance and it must do all it can to 
support their implementation in its neighbourhood nations 
through bilateral and international efforts, while effectively 
securing its own borders and improving its intelligence 
infrastructure and analysis capabilities.  
8. Conclusion 
In view of the varied and complex nuclear threats that India faces, 
its relevant strategy must be able to find the right approach to 
stabilise the situation with Pakistan while avoiding getting into a 
messy and expensive arms race with China. This requires staying 
focussed on certain necessary nuclear hardware while at the same 
time playing a sophisticated game of perception manipulation of 
the adversary. 
India ascribes a narrow purpose to its nuclear weapons. These are 
considered a means of deterrence only against nuclear weapons of 
the adversary and to be used only for safeguarding oneself against 
nuclear blackmail or coercion. India rejects the concept of nuclear 
war-fighting. Protection of the country can only come from 
deterring the other‟s use of these weapons against oneself rather 
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than using them against the adversary especially when he himself 
has a secure second-strike capability which is sure to bring 
retaliation upon oneself. By premising its nuclear strategy on such 
an understanding, India has freed itself from the need to build a 
large arsenal or to do it competitively with the adversary. Without 
mentioning numbers, the essential message has always been that 
the arsenal would be large enough to cause unacceptable damage 
(Sethi, 2016). But then, given the nature of the destructive potential 
of this weapon, not too many are needed in any case. Rather, what 
is necessary is the ability to project confidence in the capability to 
inflict damage that the adversary would find unbearable.  
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End Notes 
                                                          
i According to a report prepared by Michael Pillsbury for the US 
bipartisan China Economic and Security Review Commission that is 
based on writings of 20 Chinese military strategists, there are three 
books and several dozen articles going back a decade that advocate 
development of ASAT to covertly shoot down satellites to send a 
deterrent message (Muradian, 2007). 
ii Technically, first strike is an attack so powerful so as to leave one‟s 
opponents with forces which are insufficient to inflict substantial 
damage on the attacker.  
